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 People often shop when feeling sad, but whether and why shopping reduces residual 
(lingering) sadness remains an open question. Sadness is strongly associated with a sense that 
situational forces control the outcomes in one’s life, and thus we theorized that the choices 
inherent in shopping may restore personal control over one’s environment and reduce residual 
sadness. Three experiments provided support for our hypothesis. Making shopping choices 
helped to alleviate sadness whether they were hypothetical (Experiment 1) or real (Experiment 
2). In addition, all experiments found support for the underlying mechanism of personal control 
restoration. Notably, the benefits of restored personal control over one’s environment do not 
generalize to anger (Experiments 2 and 3), because anger is associated with a sense that other 
people (rather than situational forces) are likely to cause negative outcomes, and these appraisals 
are not ameliorated by restoring personal control over one’s environment.  
 









 How do people regulate distress? Several common responses to distress have been 
documented, such as rumination, overeating, and alcohol consumption. Distress can also 
encourage unplanned purchases (e.g., Atalay & Meloy, 2011, Study 1). Shopping that is 
motivated by distress – “retail therapy” – is often lamented as ineffective, wasteful, and a “dark 
side” of consumer behavior (Kasser & Sheldon, 2000). Popular press accounts of retail therapy 
typically paint an equally dismal picture (Tuttle, 2010).  
 We propose that retail therapy has been viewed too negatively. Shopping may be an 
effective way to minimize sadness that lingers (residual sadness) following a sadness-inducing 
event. We focus on shopping’s potential to reduce residual sadness in particular, as previous 
research has demonstrated that sadness increases comfort-seeking (Raghunathan, Pham, & 
Corfman, 2006) and willingness-to-pay (Cryder et al., 2008; Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, 
2004).   
 Prior research has provided some suggestive evidence that shopping can convey 
psychological benefits (Gardner & Rook, 1988). In a diary study, Atalay and Meloy (2011, Study 
3) found that most participants reported positive feelings when reflecting on their most recent 
purchase that was motivated by a desire to repair mood. Faber and Christenson (1996, Table 3) 
found that people recalled that they were less likely to experience sadness while shopping than 
immediately before going shopping.  
 However, causal conclusions remain elusive, as no prior research investigating the 
influence of shopping on emotion or mood has utilized experimental designs. Without random 
assignment to shopping or equally engaging “control” activities, it is unclear whether shopping 
conveys benefits beyond those produced merely by distraction or the passage of time.  
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In addition, research in this area has only loosely conceptualized both affect and 
shopping. Atalay and Meloy (2011) utilized broad measures of mood (p. 642) and positive 
emotion and negative emotion indices (p. 653), rather than investigating the experience of 
specific emotions. Faber and Christenson (1996, p. 809) asked participants to report how they 
generally feel “while shopping,” without referencing any specific shopping episode. Because 
“shopping” can have many components, including browsing, interacting with salespeople, 
choosing, paying, acquiring, and consuming, retrospective reports about “shopping” cannot shed 
light on which component(s) are necessary for healing to occur.  
This last point is not merely a descriptive shortcoming. Differences in the effectiveness of 
specific components could shed light on why shopping reduces residual sadness. To develop 
hypotheses about why some components will be particularly influential, we consider sadness 
from an appraisal tendency theory perspective (Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007). Appraisal theory 
suggests that the way people cognitively appraise their environment is both a cause and 
consequence of different emotions. Smith and Ellsworth (1985) identified six appraisals that 
differentiate emotions: the extent to which the current situation is pleasant, predictable, 
demanding of attention, demanding of effort, under human (versus situational) control, and under 
one’s own or other people’s control. Thus, similarly valenced emotions can differ on other 
important dimensions (e.g., anger and fear are both aversive, but anger is associated with greater 
certainty; Lerner & Keltner, 2001). 
Sadness, more than any other emotion, is associated with a perceived deficiency in 
personal control over one’s environment (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). People who are sad are 
especially likely to view outcomes as governed by situational forces and chance, rather than their 
own actions. To the extent that these appraisals create or maintain the experience of sadness 
5 
(Han et al., 2007), aspects of shopping that restore a sense of personal control over one’s 
environment may subsequently reduce residual sadness. Indeed, Garg and Lerner (2013, p. 112) 
proposed that researchers should investigate whether “feeling less helpless correspond[s] with 
feeling less sad.” 
Prior research suggests that the ability to choose tends to enhance one’s sense of personal 
control (Inesi et al., 2011; Langer, 1975). Because choices are inherent to shopping (e.g., 
choosing whether to buy), shopping may restore a sense of control and thus minimize residual 
sadness.  
Of course, aside from choice, other aspects of the shopping experience could influence 
sadness. For example, shopping may provide distraction (cf. Kim & Rucker, 2012) or social 
interaction (O’Guinn & Faber, 1989). In what follows, we experimentally isolate the influence of 
choice on the experience of sadness by utilizing simplified paradigms that necessarily strip away 
extraneous factors that can accompany naturalistic shopping. For example, there is no 
consumption or social interaction in our experiments. We control for the benefits of distraction in 
Experiment 1 by including a “browsing” control condition, in which participants must interact 
with products but cannot buy any.  
We focus on choice for two reasons. First, choice is the component of shopping that is 
most theoretically linked to personal control. Given that sadness is characterized by a lack of 
personal control over one’s environment, the control imbued by making shopping choices may 
help reduce residual sadness. Second, we focus on choice because it is arguably the most 
fundamental component of shopping. While shopping may or may not involve factors not present 
in our experiments (e.g., social interaction), shopping always involves choice.  
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We propose that making shopping choices can help to restore a sense of personal control 
over one’s environment, but many people may have difficulty quantifying and articulating the 
extent to which they feel control over their environment. (In their classic demonstration, Smith 
and Ellsworth (1985, p. 820) utilized a group of participants pre-screened to be highly 
emotionally expressive, and asked them to recall their experiences of control during a specific 
emotional event, rather than their current, ambient feelings of control over their environment.) 
Thus, in what follows we shed light on our proposed process by experimentally manipulating 
personal control (cf. Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). We do so by manipulating whether 
participants can freely choose among a broad product assortment (Experiment 1), whether 
participants believe they can ensure that they obtain their preferred product (Experiment 2), and 
whether participants recall an instance of high or low control over their environment 
(Experiment 3).  
Experiment 1 
 Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis that making shopping choices helps to restore 
personal control over one’s environment, which can in turn help to alleviate residual sadness. We 
randomly assigned participants to choose which of several products they would hypothetically 
buy, or to judge which of those products would be most useful when traveling. Conceptually, our 
intention was to manipulate the extent to which participants could exercise personal autonomy 
during the task (since only a handful of the products are appropriate for travel, but any could be 
selected by hypothetical buyers), while holding constant distraction and (lack of) product 
acquisition across conditions.  
Method 
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One hundred adults (52% female, mean age: 36) participated in an online study for a 
small payment. We recruited participants via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), a platform 
validated by Paolacci et al. (2010). We initially collected a baseline measure of emotions. 
Specifically, participants indicated the extent to which they were currently experiencing seven 
different emotions (amused, sad, indifferent, angry, depressed, happy, rage), by moving a slider 
along a 12mm line anchored by the labels “not at all” and “very much.” Responses were scored 
on a 0-100 scale based on where participants rested the slider. 
Participants then viewed a three-minute clip from The Champ portraying the death of a 
boy’s mentor, which reliably induces sadness (Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007). We then took a 
second measure of emotions, identical to our baseline measure. 
We then randomly assigned participants to a Choosing or Browsing condition, adapting a 
design by Mazar and Zhong (2010). Choosers were told to “imagine buying $100 worth of 
products, by placing them in a shopping cart.” Choosers then viewed 12 products (e.g., slippers, 
headphones; see Figure 1), each priced at $25. Choosers were asked to select four products they 
would hypothetically like to buy, by clicking on four products and dragging them into a box 
labeled “Your Shopping Cart.” Choosers were informed that the shopping was hypothetical, and 
they had no expectation of obtaining these items.  
Browsers viewed the same 12 products and were asked to judge which four products 
would be most useful when traveling, by clicking on four products and dragging them into a box 
labeled “Travel Items.” There was no significant difference in the amount of time spent on the 
Choosing and Browsing tasks (60.7 seconds vs. 58.2 seconds; t(98) < 1).  
 We then administered a third (and final) measure of emotions, identical to our baseline 
measure.  
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We conducted a pre-test on MTurk (N = 42, 43% female, mean age: 33) to confirm that 
the Choosing task was more likely to generate feelings of control than the Browsing task. 
Participants completed both the Choosing and Browsing tasks (which were labeled the Shopping 
Cart task and the Travel Items task, respectively, for participants). The order of tasks was 
counterbalanced across participants. We then asked, “In which task did you feel you had more 
control over the items you selected?” Participants selected one of five options: Definitely the 
Travel Items task, Probably the Travel Items task, No difference between the Shopping Cart and 
Travel Items tasks, Probably the Shopping Cart task, Definitely the Shopping Cart task. Seventy-
nine percent of participants reported that they (probably or definitely) felt more control while 
Choosing, whereas only 2% reported that they (probably or definitely) felt more control while 
Browsing (χ2(1) = 50.6, p < .0001). Thus, while both tasks likely generate, to some extent, a 
sense of personal control over one’s environment, the Choosing task is a more effective way to 
increase a sense of personal control.  
Results 
 To verify that our manipulation worked as intended, we examined whether the selection 
of products reflected greater autonomy among Choosers. Free choice among options imbues a 
sense of control and autonomy by allowing people to implement or reveal their individual 
preferences. Browsers were asked to select the products most appropriate for travel, but only a 
handful of the products were appropriate for travel. By contrast, Choosers were free to select any 
product. Choosers’ greater ability to control which products they select should be reflected by 
greater variance in their selections.  
 Figure 2 displays the proportion of participants selecting each product by condition. 
There was significantly greater variance in product selection among Choosers than Browsers 
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(F(1,22) = 4.47, p < .05, Levene’s test). If Browsers could freely choose to the same extent as 
Choosers, there would be a similar degree of variance in selected products across conditions. The 
unequal variance in product selections across conditions is consistent with the notion that 
Choosers experienced more control during the task.  
 We next tested our central hypothesis that choosing would be more likely than browsing 
to alleviate residual sadness. Sad and depressed ratings correlated highly (r(98) > .65, p < .0001 
at each measurement), and were averaged to form a sadness index at each measurement. We 
created a residual sadness score by subtracting participants’ baseline index scores from their final 
index scores. This commonly-used method controls for broad individual differences in the 
tendency to experience and express emotions (cf. Kermer et al., 2006; Oveis et al., 2009; Rogosa 
& Willett, 1983; Wilson et al., 2000). Three outliers, with residual sadness scores more than 
three standard deviations from the mean, were excluded.  
 As expected, residual sadness scores were significantly lower among Choosers than 
Browsers (M = 2.9, SD = 8.6 vs. M = 8.1, SD = 14.5; t(95) = 2.13, p < .05). In other words, 
making hypothetical buying choices was more likely to return participants to their baseline level 
of sadness than was browsing.  
 Thus, Experiment 1 provides initial support for the hypothesis that making shopping 
choices helps to alleviate residual sadness. The results of the pre-test and the greater variance in 
product selections among Choosers suggest that the mechanism underlying this effect is a 
restoration of personal control.  
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 extends our investigation in three ways. First, all participants made real 
(consequential) shopping decisions. Second, to isolate the role of restored control in retail 
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therapy, all participants actually obtained their preferred option, but we manipulated the extent to 
which they had apparent control over the process of obtaining that option. Third, to shed 
additional light on the process of personal control restoration, we examined whether the benefits 
of making shopping choices are specific to sadness or generalize to other negative emotions. In 
particular, we examined whether making shopping choices also helps to alleviate anger. Anger is 
generally as aversive as sadness, but is associated with a sense that other people (rather than 
situational forces) cause negative outcomes (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Whereas making 
shopping choices may help restore a sense of personal control over one’s environment, those 
choices are unlikely to reduce the extent to which other people are viewed as unfairly or unduly 
influential. Thus, enhancing control over one’s environment should have more impact on sadness 
than on anger.    
Method 
One hundred forty-seven undergraduates from a Midwestern university participated for 
course credit. Six participants who failed to follow instructions (e.g., texting during the 
experiment) were excluded. We initially collected a baseline measure of eight emotions (sad, 
indifferent, angry, happy, depressed, enraged, amused, neutral) on 0-100 scales.  
We then induced either sadness or anger. In the Sadness condition, participants viewed 
the same clip from The Champ used in Experiment 1. In the Anger condition, participants 
viewed a 2.5-minute clip from Cry Freedom that portrays young, unarmed protesters being 
gunned down by opposition forces. This clip reliably induces anger (Rottenberg et al., 2007).  
Following the emotion induction, participants were told that they would be given a $5 
spending budget as part of a real shopping experience. They were told that they could buy one of 
three products (a set of post-it notes, a set of highlighters, or a set of ball point pens), all offered 
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in the lab for $5 (approximately equal to their actual retail prices). They were also told that they 
could choose to buy none of these products, and trade in their spending budget for $1 in real 
cash. We disincentivized not buying because walking away with the full $5 budget would have 
been an easy choice for most participants (as they did not come to the lab intending to stock up 
on office supplies). This ensured that there was engagement in the shopping task and that choices 
were actively considered. Our sadness versus anger induction did not significantly influence the 
proportion of participants choosing to buy one of the products (62% vs. 74%, χ2(1) = 2.46, p > 
.10), and the buyer versus non-buyer distinction did not moderate our results.  
We also embedded a manipulation of personal agency in the shopping task by adapting a 
procedure validated by Berman and Small (2012). Specifically, we told participants that, after 
they made their choice, the computer would randomly draw a number from 1 to 10. If the 
randomly generated number was even, they would simply obtain whatever they chose. However, 
if the randomly generated number was odd, the computer would ignore their choice and 
randomly make a selection on their behalf. In the Personal Control condition, the randomly 
selected number was even, and participants were told that they would obtain what they chose. In 
the Situational Control condition, the randomly selected number was odd, and then the computer 
ostensibly made a random selection on their behalf (in fact, always selecting the option 
participants had selected for themselves). Thus, at the end of this task and before collecting our 
final measure of emotions, all participants knew that they would obtain the option they preferred. 
All that varied across the Personal Control versus Situational Control conditions was the amount 
of control participants believed they had over the process.  
 We then administered a second (and final) measure of emotions, identical to our baseline 
measure. Finally, participants either obtained their selected product or $1 in cash.  
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Results  
 Sad and depressed ratings correlated highly (r(139) > .42, p < .0001 at each 
measurement), and were averaged to form a sadness index at each measurement. Angry and 
enraged ratings correlated highly (r(139) > .56, p < .0001 at each measurement), and were 
averaged to form an anger index at each measurement. We created residual sadness and anger 
scores by subtracting participants’ baseline index scores from their final index scores.  
 Figure 3 displays the focal residual emotion in each condition (i.e., residual sadness in the 
Sadness conditions and residual anger in the Anger conditions). As predicted, residual sadness 
scores in the Sadness conditions were significantly higher in the Situational Control condition 
than in the Personal Control condition (M = 3.73, SD = 10.78 vs. M = -2.28, SD = 11.79; t(69) = 
2.24, p < .05). However, residual anger scores in the Anger conditions did not differ significantly 
between the Situational Control and Personal Control conditions (M = 14.75, SD = 25.69 vs. M = 
14.17, SD = 30.91; t(68) = .09, p = .93).  
Experiment 2 suggests that real shopping can help to alleviate residual sadness, unless 
that shopping experience further reduces personal control over situational forces. By contrast, 
restoring personal control is as ineffective as further jeopardizing personal control at alleviating 
residual anger. Anger is naturally associated with a sense that other people are likely to cause 
negative outcomes, and thus restoring control over ambient environmental forces does not appear 
to address the key control deficit associated with anger.    
Experiment 3 
 Experiment 3 extends our investigation by focusing more closely on the underlying 
mechanism of personal control restoration. Specifically, we examine whether a direct 
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manipulation of control over one’s environment (outside of a shopping context) is more likely to 
influence sadness than anger.  
Method 
 Three hundred and one undergraduates from a Southern university (51% female) 
participated for course credit. We initially collected a baseline measure of nine emotions (happy, 
angry, sad, indifferent, enraged, depressed, amused, anxious, and neutral) on 0-100 scales. 
 We then induced sadness, anger, or neutral emotion. We included a Neutral condition to 
examine whether our subsequent control manipulation (discussed below) generated any 
emotional costs or benefits even in the absence of a negative emotion induction. In the Sadness 
condition, participants viewed the clip from The Champ used in previous experiments. In the 
Anger condition, participants viewed a four-minute clip from My Bodyguard that portrays a 
bullying incident. This clip reliably induces anger (Rottenberg et al., 2007). In the Neutral 
condition, participants viewed a 2.5-minute clip from National Geographic about coral reefs (cf. 
Lerner et al., 2004). 
 Following the emotion induction, we asked participants to either recall an instance in 
which they experienced control over an important situation (Personal Control condition) or 
experienced no control over an important situation (Situational Control condition). We carefully 
worded our recall prompts to prevent participants from considering instances in which they had 
control over other people, or were controlled by other people (see Appendix).  




 Sad and depressed ratings correlated highly (r(299) > .67, p < .0001 at each 
measurement), and were averaged to form a sadness index at each measurement. Angry and 
enraged ratings correlated highly (r(299) > .73, p < .0001 at each measurement), and were 
averaged to form an anger index at each measurement. We created residual sadness and anger 
scores by subtracting participants’ baseline index scores from their final index scores.  
 Figure 4 displays the focal residual emotion in the Sadness and Anger conditions. As 
predicted, residual sadness scores in the Sadness conditions were significantly higher in the 
Situational Control condition than in the Personal Control condition (M = 12.1, SD = 14.8 vs. M 
= 2.89, SD = 16.3; t(99) = 2.97, p < .01). However, residual anger scores in the Anger conditions 
did not differ significantly between the Situational Control and Personal Control conditions (M = 
4.6, SD = 14.8 vs. M = 4.7, SD = 17.7; t(97) = .03, p = .97).  
  In the Neutral conditions, neither residual sadness scores nor residual anger scores 
differed significantly across the Situational Control and Personal Control conditions (both ps > 
.05). Residual scores for all the other individual emotions measured (happy, indifferent, amused, 
anxious, neutral) also did not differ significantly across the Situational Control and Personal 
Control conditions (all ps > .05). Thus, it appears that our control manipulation did not generate 
any clear emotional costs or benefits among people in a neutral emotional state.  
  Consistent with our theoretical framework (and Experiment 2), the experience of sadness 
(which is naturally associated with a sense that situational forces control outcomes) is smaller 
when personal control over one’s environment is restored than when it is further jeopardized. By 
contrast, the experience of anger (which is naturally associated with a sense that other people 
cause negative outcomes) is unaffected by differences in control over one’s environment. To the 
extent that making shopping choices enhances feelings of personal control over one’s 
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environment, these results suggest that shopping is likely to alleviate sadness but not necessarily 
anger.  
General Discussion 
Previous research suggests that distress can increase willingness to spend (e.g., Atalay & 
Meloy, 2011; Lerner et al., 2004), but the question of whether “retail therapy” actually helps to 
reduce distress has only been addressed in correlational designs, utilizing surveys and interviews 
of people who chose to shop when feeling bad. We addressed this gap by experimentally 
examining whether making shopping choices could help to reduce residual sadness. 
Three experiments provided support for the notion that making shopping choices helps to 
restore a sense of personal control over one’s environment, and thus helps to alleviate residual 
sadness. We observed these benefits regardless of whether the shopping was hypothetical or real. 
We also documented support for the underlying mechanism of personal control restoration. We 
found that the effects of manipulating personal control over one’s environment did not generalize 
to anger. Anger is associated with a sense that other people are likely to cause negative 
outcomes, and changes in personal control over situational forces cannot necessarily reduce the 
extent to which other people are viewed as unfairly or unduly influential.  
Our work contributes to research on emotion and decision-making. Most work in this 
area has focused on how specific emotions influence decision-making and consumption (e.g., 
Cryder et al., 2008; Garg & Lerner, 2013; Garg et al., 2007; Lerner et al., 2004). By contrast, our 
paper joins a growing stream of research examining how decision-making influences the 
experience of specific emotions (Berman & Small, 2012; Gal & Liu, 2011). 
Our work also contributes to appraisal theories of emotion. Prior work had demonstrated 
that the cognitive appraisals that accompany an emotion can be deactivated by addressing the 
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source of emotion (e.g., the cognitive effects of anger are extinguished when the perpetrator that 
caused the anger is punished; Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999). Our work suggests that 
counteracting a particular cognitive appraisal (here, restoring personal control after it has been 
lost) may help to extinguish the emotion that elicited the appraisal, consistent with the 
“recursive” nature of emotions and their associated appraisals (Han et al., 2007).  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 An ideal test of the impact of restored personal control on the experience of sadness and 
anger would require inductions that initially produced similarly intense experiences of sadness 
and anger (before the focal control manipulation). Otherwise, differences in initial emotional 
intensity could potentially explain differences in responsiveness to the focal control 
manipulation. Unfortunately, pooling across the Personal and Situational Control conditions in 
Experiment 2, residual anger in the Anger conditions was significantly greater than residual 
sadness in the Sadness conditions (14.45 vs. 0.68, p < .01). By contrast, residual anger in the 
Anger conditions was slightly lower than residual sadness in the Sadness conditions in 
Experiment 3 (4.67 vs. 7.53, p = .21). Despite these differences (within and across experiments), 
we always found that residual sadness was sensitive to the Personal versus Situational control 
manipulations, but residual anger never was. Thus, our results do not appear to be an artifact of 
intensity differences across induced emotions. (An intensity account would suggest that only the 
most intense or least intense emotion would be influenced by our control manipulations.) 
Future research on retail therapy could examine shopping aspects other than choice that 
might address the key symptom (sadness) but not its cause (loss of personal control). While we 
carefully controlled for many features associated with shopping so that we could isolate 
restoration of control as a key feature of retail therapy, we believe that residual sadness may also 
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be reduced in ways that do not directly address the control deficit. For example, social 
interaction may increase positive emotions and perhaps mitigate sadness (O’Guinn & Faber, 
1989). The distraction provided by shopping is another possibility. Neither of these shopping 
aspects replace the lost control intrinsic to sadness, but both may impact a consumer’s overall 
emotional state. 
Future research could also further explore the foundational link between control and 
sadness. We found that restoring personal control following exposure to sad stimuli helped to 
reduce residual sadness. Future work could examine whether imbuing people with high personal 
control helps immunize them from the effects of sad stimuli encountered later.  
Conclusion 
 Retail therapy is often considered wasteful. For example, when we asked 100 adults 
(52% female, mean age: 35) for the first word that came to mind when hearing “retail therapy,” 
they were more than twice as likely to provide a clear negative response (e.g., nonsense, debt) 
than to provide a clear positive response (e.g., fun, enjoyment) (19% vs. 8%; χ2(1) = 5.18, p < 
.05; other responses were neutral, such as shopping). But no prior research had experimentally 
examined whether and why shopping when sad can actually help to reduce residual sadness. Our 
work suggests that making shopping choices can help to restore a sense of personal control over 
one’s environment and reduce residual sadness. Whether the increased control afforded by 
shopping results in a loss of control later (due to increased debt), and thus counteracts the 
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Note: Error bars represent ± 1 standard error. 
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Note: Error bars represent ± 1 standard error. 
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Please recall a particular incident in which you did not have any control over a situation 
important to you. By control, we mean a circumstance in which you could not control your 
environment in a way that allowed you to achieve something you wanted. For instance, this 
could be a time when you failed to exert the control necessary to overcome an obstacle, or when 
your actions could not change an important situation to meet your needs. Note that this does not 
involve lack of control – or lack of power – over other people, just lack of control over your 
environment. Please describe this situation in which you did not have any control—what 





Please recall a particular incident in which you had complete control over a situation important 
to you. By control, we mean a circumstance in which you controlled your environment in a way 
that allowed you to achieve something you wanted. For instance, this could be a time when you 
succeeded in exerting control to overcome an obstacle, or when your actions effectively changed 
an important situation to meet your needs. Note that this does not involve control – or power – 
over other people, just control over your environment. Please describe this situation in which you 
had complete, effective control—what happened, how you felt, etc. 
 
